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Torts
by Phillip Comer Griffeth
and Cash V. Morris"
This Article surveys recent developments in Georgia tort law between
June 1, 2010 and May 31, 2011.1
I.

NEGLIGENCE

In motor vehicle collision cases, the Georgia Court of Appeals
reminded plaintiffs that they must present positive evidence that the
"accident and damages were caused by specific acts of negligence on the
part of that defendant"' and cannot rely on inferences of negligence
based upon "evidence which is too uncertain or speculative."' In Werner
Enterprises v. Lambdin, the defendant's past driving record was
inadmissible to prove negligence when the defendant claimed no fault
However, witness
and the plaintiff could not recall the accident.'

* Solo Practitioner, Phillip Comer Griffeth, LLC, Athens, Georgia. Davidson College
(B.A., 1989); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1993).
Member, Mercer Law Review (1991-1993); Georgia Survey Editor (1992-1993). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
Thanks to Deron Hicks and Travis Hargrove for passing the baton (at least for this year!)
nineteen years after I edited the forty-fourth volume of the Annual Survey of Georgia Law.
** Partner in the firm of Mayer & Harper, LLP, Athens, Georgia. Georgia Institute of
Technology (B.S., with honors, 2003); Georgia State University School of Law (J.D., 2007).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of Georgia tort law during the prior survey period, see Deron R.
Hicks & Travis C. Hargrove, Torts, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 62 MERCER L. REV. 317
(2010).
2. Hunsucker v. Belford, 304 Ga. App. 200, 202, 695 S.E.2d 405, 408 (2010) (quoting
Cromer v. Hodges, 216 Ga. App. 548, 549, 455 S.E.2d 94, 96 (1995)) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Turner v. Masters, 304 Ga. App. 855, 857, 698 S.E.2d 346, 349
(2010) (holding that even if the plaintiff establishes negligence per se of the defendant, it
may be inadequate proof).
3. Werner Enters., Inc. v. Lambdin, 307 Ga. App. 813,815, 706 S.E.2d 185, 186(2011).
4. 307 Ga. App. 813, 706 S.E.2d 185 (2011).
5. Id. at 814-15, 706 S.E.2d at 186-87.
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testimony regarding the defendant's behavior and driving in the hour
before a collision may be admissible as relevant to whether he was
speeding at the time of the collision.'
In addition to Shelter Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bryant7 and Dees v.
Logan,' Schwartz v. Brancheau' will likely provide injured plaintiffs
with a new citation regarding the use of evidence of an intoxicated
defendant when the plaintiff is seeking to recover only compensatory
damages.o In Schwartz, despite a stipulation to negligence by the
defendant and dismissal of the plaintiffs punitive damages claim, the
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant's
motion in limine to preclude evidence of the defendant's consumption of
alcohol." The court of appeals rejected the appellant's assertion that
it had stipulated to liability, not just negligence, as the record reflected
that the defendant was not conceding his negligence was the proximate
cause of the plaintiffs injuries.1 The rule remains when the defendant
has admitted negligence but not causation or damages, evidence of a
defendant's alcohol consumption that is inextricably linked with the
accident and defendant's negligence is admissible even if the plaintiff is
not seeking punitive damages."
In Kesterson v. Jarrett," the court of appeals analyzed a civil
litigant's right to be present at trial and articulated when a trial court
may limit a severely injured plaintiff's attendance if their "presence
would prejudice the jury and the plaintiff would be unable to assist
counsel or comprehend the proceedings" as a result of injuries allegedly
caused by the defendant."
Finding no case law interpreting the
Georgia Constitution or statutes providing a litigant with an absolute
right to attend trial, the court determined, citing the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Helminski v. Ayerst
Laboratories," that the right was protected by the constitutional right

6. Royalston v. Middlebrooks, 303 Ga. App. 887, 891, 696 S.E.2d 66, 70 (2010).
7. 220 Ga. App. 526, 469 S.E.2d 792 (1996).
8. 281 Ga. App. 837, 637 S.E.2d 424 (2006), rev'd on othergrounds, 282 Ga. 815, 653
S.E.2d 735 (2007).
9. 306 Ga. App. 463, 702 S.E.2d 737 (2010).
10. Id. at 464, 702 S.E.2d at 739. In Schwartz, after entering into a limited release
with the defendant, the plaintiffs uninsured motorist carrier defended the suit on the
defendant's behalf. Id.
11. Id. at 468, 702 S.E.2d at 741.
12. Id. at 466, 702 S.E.2d at 740.
13. Id. (quoting Shelter Mutual, 220 Ga. App. at 528, 469 S.E.2d at 795).
14. 307 Ga. App. 244, 704 S.E.2d 878 (2010), cert. granted.
15. Id. at 250, 704 S.E.2d at 883-84.
16. 766 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1985).
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of due process of law." Reviewing decisions from other jurisdictions
and ultimately relying on the reasoning in Helminski to balance the
litigant's right with the possibility of prejudicing the jury, the court held
that a trial court has the discretion to limit a severely injured
plaintiff's presence during the liability phase of a bifurcated trial when,
after an evidentiary hearing upon a written motion and after an
opportunity to observe the plaintiff, the court makes the following
factual findings in a written order: (1) the plaintiff is severely injured;
(2) the plaintiff attributes those injuries to the conduct of the defendant(s); (3) there is a substantial likelihood that the plaintiffs presence
in the courtroom will cause the jury to be biased toward the plaintiff
based on sympathy rather than the evidence such that the jury would
be prevented or substantially impaired from performing its duty; (4)
the plaintiff is unable to communicate with counsel or to participate in
the trial in any meaningful way; and (5) the plaintiff is unable to
comprehend the proceedings.' 8
In Cavalier Convenience, Inc. v. Sarvis, 9 the court of appeals held
that the recently amended section 51-12-33 of the Official Code of
Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) 20 requires a trier of fact to apportion its
damage award among multiple liable defendants even when the plaintiff
bears no fault.2 1 In Cavalier, no defendant alleged the plaintiff was at
fault. After entry of the pretrial order, plaintiff sought a ruling from the
court that the issue of apportionment among defendants not be
22
presented to the jury since the language of O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b)
only mandates apportionment when the plaintiff was to some degree at
fault." Focusing on the clause in subsection (b) beginning "shall after"
as establishing a precondition of comparative negligence under

17. Kesterson, 307 Ga. App. at 248-49, 704 S.E.2d at 882-83 (citing Helminski, 766 F.2d
at 213). "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also GA. CONST., art. I, § 1, para. 1.
18. Kesterson, 307 Ga. App. at 250, 704 S.E.2d at 884. The court was clear that if the
litigant could understand and assist counsel, the party could not be excluded based on
prejudice. Id.
19. 305 Ga. App. 141, 699 S.E.2d 104 (2010), cert. granted.
20. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 (2000 & Supp. 2011).
21. Cavalier, 305 Ga. App. at 145, 699 S.E.2d at 107; see also O.C.G.A. § 5-12-33.
22.
Where an action is brought against more than one person for injury to person or
property, the trier of fact, in its determination of the total amount of damages to
be awarded, if any, shall after a reduction of damages pursuant to subsection (a)
of this Code section, if any, apportion its award of damages among the persons
who are liable according to the percentage of fault of each person.
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b).
23. Cavalier, 305 Ga. App. at 141-42, 699 S.E.2d at 105.
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subsection (a), 24 the trial court granted plaintiff's motion.25 On
interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals reversed.26
On de novo review, the court looked to the statute's plain language to
give effect to the legislature's intent and found that the trial court's
reading of the statute overlooked and disregarded the "if any" clause
following the "shall after" clause, incorrectly limiting apportionment to
Although not expressly stated in
comparative negligence cases."
Cavalier, the "if any" clause only provides that when comparative
negligence exists, apportionment should occur after a reduction for
plaintiff's negligence. Nonparty allocation under subsection (c)2 8 was
not raised by the parties nor was it addressed by the court. However,
in McReynolds v. Krebs,2 9 the court of appeals explained in dicta that
"[s]ubsections (c) and (d) explain that apportionment is to be determined
based on the fault of all parties liable for the plaintiffs injuries
regardless of whether they are parties to the suit, including parties who
have settled with the plaintiff"o Despite this, argument of apportionment to a nonparty was not allowed because the remaining defendant
had no evidence of the dismissed nonparty defendant's potential liability
to the plaintiff.a"
II.

PREMISES LIABILITY

Barrow,3 2

the court of appeals affirmed summary judgIn Jones v.
ment to a landowner of rural property occasionally used by friends and
family to hunt and fish." The court held that the plaintiff, a co-worker
of the landowner's nephew's friend, was a licensee on Barrow's property,
rather than an invitee, and that Barrow did not breach his duty owed to
Jones, who was injured while using a chainsaw to cut into a partially
24. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(a).
25. Cavalier,305 Ga. App. at 141-42, 699 S.E.2d at 105; see also O.CG.A. § 51-12-33(b).
26. Cavalier,305 Ga. App. at 141, 699 S.E.2d at 105.
27. Id. at 144, 699 S.E.2d at 106; see also O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b).
28. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(c).
29. 307 Ga. App. 330, 705 S.E.2d 214 (2010), cert. granted.
30. Id. at 333, 705 S.E.2d at 217; see also O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(c)-(d).
31. McReynolds, 307 Ga. App. at 334, 705 S.E.2d at 217; see also PN Express, Inc. v.
Zegel, 304 Ga. App. 672, 680, 697 S.E.2d 226, 233 (2010) (holding no apportionment where
party's liability is derivative for nonparty employee); cf Barnett v. Farmer, 308 Ga. App.
358, 362, 707 S.E.2d 570, 573-74 (2011) (holding apportionment charge required for
plaintiff passenger between defendant driver and plaintiff husband driver); Murray v.
Patel, 304 Ga. App. 253, 254, 696 S.E.2d 97, 99 (2010) (holding that in automobile
negligence case, subsection (b) requires apportionment of liability between defendant driver
and third-party defendant who was the son and driver of the plaintiffs' vehicle).
32. 304 Ga. App. 337, 696 S.E.2d 363 (2010).
33. Id. at 337, 696 S.E.2d at 364-65.
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downed tree. Jones was not on the property to conduct business with
Barrow, but for the convenience of his co-worker; Barrow did not even
know they were on the property?5 Further, they were not guests of
Barrow's nephew, who was not his uncle's tenant but was, himself, a
licensee permitted to go on the property merely for personal interests.3 6
Also, "the passive or static condition of.

.

. [the] tree . .. located far from

any road and within a densely wooded area . .. was not a mantrap and
did not constitute wilful or wanton conduct . . . .

However, whether a plaintiff is a licensee or invitee is sometimes a
jury question." If a jury finds the plaintiff visited the property to look
at real property being offered for sale and was not on the property
merely for his own interest or convenience," he could be an invitee
rather than a licensee.40 Apparently the plaintiff's counsel need not
rely upon their own expert in opposing summary judgment, but rather
may use the testimony of a defendant's expert to raise an issue of
fact.41
An even lesser duty is owed to a trespasser than to a licensee. In
Craig v. Bailey Bros. Realty, Inc.,42 Ja] ten-year-old girl was injured by
a landscape timber spike protruding from a railroad crosstie" and could
not recover from an apartment complex because the owner had no duty
to protect her from hidden perils.4 3 The plaintiff tried to argue that his

34. Id. at 340, 696 S.E.2d at 366-67.
35. Id. at 339, 696 S.E.2d at 366.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 340, 696 S.E.2d at 366-67.
38. McGarity v. Hart Elec. Membership Corp., 307 Ga. App. 739, 744, 706 S.E.2d 676,
681 (2011). But see Freeman v. Eichholz, 308 Ga. App. 18, 705 S.E.2d 919 (2011). In
Freeman, the court of appeals held as a matter of law that a visitor to a state prison was
an invitee. Id. at 18, 705 S.E.2d at 921. Though conceding that the issue had not been
previously addressed by Georgia's appellate courts, the court limited its holding to the facts
of the case. Id. at 20-21, 705 S.E.2d at 922.
39. He also apparently had to urinate. McGarity, 307 Ga. App. at 740, 706 S.E.2d at
678.
40. Id. at 739-40, 706 S.E.2d at 677-78. The plaintiff "made contact with a live
electrical wire while visiting real property that was being advertised for sale" and alleged
that defendant, "which had installed and maintained the electrical wire (on private
property on which it had an easement), . . . negligently maintained and inspected the wire."
Id. at 739, 706 S.E.2d at 677-78. Interestingly, when moving for summary judgment, the
defendant argued that the plaintiff was a trespasser, but abandoned that argument on
appeal to argue he was at best a licensee. Id. at 742, 706 S.E.2d at 679.
41. See id. at 746, 706 S.E.2d at 682.
42. 304 Ga. App. 794, 697 S.E.2d 888 (2010).
43. Id. at 794, 798, 697 S.E.2d at 890, 892. The court of appeals also held that the
parking lot and the crossties did not constitute an attractive nuisance nor did the owner
"fail[] to exercise reasonable care with respect to the foreseeable risks created . . . ." Id.
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daughter was an "anticipated trespasser," but the owner did not know
that the girl or her friends had come onto the property and were playing
on the crossties nor did he anticipate the entry.4 The children had not
previously entered the property or played on the crossties, and "the
crossties were not meant for pedestrian traffic.. . .
When a "static, dangerous condition" is alleged,
the basis of the proprietor's liability is his superior knowledge and if
his invitee knows of the condition or hazard there is no duty on the
part of the proprietor to warn him and there is no liability for resulting
injury because the invitee has as much knowledge as the proprietor
does. 6
However, superior knowledge may be found when a defendant is "on
constructive notice of what a reasonable inspection would have revealed"
about a condition, such as a curb, including "the curb's height in relation
to the parking lot, the lighting conditions, the view of the curb for
someone descending the stairs, and the absence of any paint or warning
signs regarding the curb . . . ."'

For example, in a slip-and-fall case

against the Comfort Inn in Valdosta, Georgia, a hotel guest had checked
out and was walking along the porch when he stepped off the curb and
broke his ankle.48 Summary judgment for the hotel was reversed.
An issue of fact remained as to whether the invitee had equal knowledge
of the danger."o

at 800,
44.
45.
46.

697 S.E.2d at 894.
Id. at 799, 697 S.E.2d at 893.
Id.
Perkins v. Val D'Aosta Co., 305 Ga. App. 126, 128, 699 S.E.2d 380, 382-83 (2010).

47. Id. at 129, 699 S.E.2d at 383.
48. Id. at 126, 699 S.E.2d at 381.
49. Id. Interestingly, plaintiff relied on a professional engineer who examined the curb
and determined it was defective and a fall hazard. Id. at 127, 699 S.E.2d at 382.
50. Id. at 130, 699 S.E.2d at 383-84 (quoting Cocklin v. JC Penney Corp., 296 Ga. App.
179, 182, 674 S.E.2d 48, 51 (2009)); see also Lore v. Suwanee Creek Homeowners Ass'n, 305
Ga. App. 165, 699 S.E.2d 332 (2010). In Lore, the court of appeals held that when a
homeowner repeatedly notified the homeowner's association of a sinkhole, the jury should
decide if the association "failed in its duty to conduct a reasonable inspection of the
sinkhole and the surrounding area to determine whether it posed a danger to invitees and
whether it failed to take reasonable steps to protect invitees from those dangers." 305 Ga.
App. at 168, 699 S.E.2d at 336. Judge Andrews dissented on this issue. Id. at 173-75, 699
S.E.2d at 339-41 (Andrews, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This constitutes
a second recent dissent by Judge Andrews, who would have found summary judgment for
the landlord. Id. at 174, 699 S.E.2d at 340; see also Walker v. Aderhold Props., Inc., 303
Ga. App. 710, 716-18, 694 S.E.2d 119, 124-15 (2010) (Andrews, J., dissenting). For a
discussion of the decision in Walker, see Hicks & Hargrove, supra note 1, at 322-25.
Compare Walker, 303 Ga. App. at 716, 694 S.E.2d at 124 (holding jury issue remained),
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Similarly, in a somewhat unusual case from Chatham County,
Georgia, an eighty-three-year-old woman housesitting at a residential
community on Skidaway Island was killed by an alligator" that bit off
The court of appeals affirmed the
her foot, hands, and forearms. 52
trial court's denial in part of the summary judgment motion filed by joint
owners of the lagoon on a premises liability theory, holding that the
"owners ... failed to show that an alligator attack upon a person was a
danger arising from the arrangement and use of their premises which
was not foreseeable as a matter of law, such that the owners had no
duty to take reasonable precautions to protect invitees from the
danger."' The court further held that the owners "failed to show that,
as a matter of law, [the decedent] equally understood the dangers she
might encounter walking near the lagoon and that she nonetheless failed
to exercise ordinary care for her own safety."
To establish constructive knowledge in a restaurant setting, a plaintiff
must show "either that (1) aln] .

.

. employee was in the immediate area

of the hazard and could have easily seen the substance or (2) the alleged
hazard remained on the floor long enough that ordinary diligence by the
... employees should have discovered it."" Although the plaintiff in
Brown v. Host/Taco Joint Venture 6 relied on his affidavit and deposition testimony, that was not enough to defeat the restaurant's motion for
summary judgment, which relied in part on an affidavit from the
restaurant manager." The court in Brown cited other cases in which
inspections conducted within fifteen minutes prior to a fall were

with Naraine v. City of Atlanta, 306 Ga. App. 561, 561, 703 S.E.2d 31, 31-32 (2010)
(holding genuine issue of fact existed as to whether city actually or constructively knew of
icy condition of sidewalk in area of fall).
51. The alligator "was over eight feet long and weighed 130 pounds." Landings Ass'n
v. Williams, 309 Ga. App. 321, 322, 711 S.E.2d 294, 296 (2011), cert. granted.
52. Id. at 322, 711 S.E.2d at 295-96.
53. Id. at 326, 711 S.E.2d at 298.
54. Id. Judge Andrews, joined by Judge Doyle, filed a dissent, noting that "as a matter
of law . . . the owners exercised ordinary care to keep [the decedent] reasonably safe from
the risk of a wild alligator attack," and even if they could be found negligent, the decedent
"either assumed the risk of encountering a dangerous wild alligator in the dark or failed
to exercise ordinary care to avoid it." Id. at 336-37, 711 S.E.2d at 305-06 (Andrews, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). For another dissent filed by Judges Andrews
and Doyle in a whole court opinion, see infra note 71.
55. Brown v. Host/Taco Joint Venture, 305 Ga. App. 248, 250, 699 S.E.2d 439, 442
(2010).
56. 305 Ga. App. 248, 699 S.E.2d 439 (2010).
57. Id. at 248-50, 699 S.E.2d at 441-42.
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reasonable."
However, in Benefield v. Tominich," the court of appeals reversed summary judgment granted to a gasoline station and a
convenience store, declining to find as a matter of law that the store's
"inspection procedures were reasonable and that it lacked constructive
knowledge of the hazard posed by [a] rubber mat."o
If a defect is "open and obvious," of which a plaintiff had equal
knowledge or equal means of knowing, no duty is owed by a property
owner to correct the alleged defect." Thus, summary judgment was
affirmed against the parents of a two-year-old "struck and killed by an
automobile while playing in the parking lot behind his parents'
apartment." As a general rule, a landlord has a legal duty to exercise
ordinary care in keeping the common areas safe, but the landlord must
have "superior knowledge of the perilous condition and the danger
therefrom . . . .' Similarly, "landlords who fully part with possession
and the right of possession of the premises are not liable to third parties

58. Id. at 252, 699 S.E.2d at 443-44 (citing Adamchick v. Cracker Barrel Old Country
Store, 281 Ga. App. 677, 678, 637 S.E.2d 44, 46 (2006); Bolton v. Wal-Mart Stores, 257 Ga.
App. 198, 199, 570 S.E.2d 643, 645 (2002); Roberson v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, 247 Ga. App.
825, 826, 544 S.E.2d 494, 495 (2001); Daniel v. John Q. Carter Enters., 218 Ga. App. 223,
225-26, 460 S.E.2d 838, 839 (1995); Super Disc. Mkts. v. Clark, 213 Ga. App. 132, 133-34,
443 S.E.2d 876, 877 (1994); Moore v. Food Assoc., 210 Ga. App. 780, 781, 437 S.E.2d 832,
834 (1993)).
59. 308 Ga. App. 605, 708 S.E.2d 563 (2011).
60. Id. at 610, 708 S.E.2d at 568. No store employees were deposed, but the store's
manager and the sole employee on duty filed affidavits. Id. at 606, 708 S.E.2d at 565. Also
of interest to appellate practitioners, two of the court's newest judges, both appointed by
Governor Perdue in November 2010, filed a concurrence "dubitante"-"a concurrence that
is given doubtfully . . . a full concurrence, albeit one with reservations"-to voice "serious
doubts" about the soundness of the principle in Straughter v. J. H. Harvey Co., 232 Ga.
App. 29, 500 S.E.2d 353 (1998) that, "in order to withstand a motion for summary
judgment, a plaintiff need not show how long a substance has been on the floor unless the
defendant has established that reasonable inspection procedures were in place and followed
at the time of the incident." Benefield, 308 Ga. App. at 611 n.28, 612, 708 S.E.2d at 569
n.28, 569 (quoting Straughter,232 Ga. App. at 30, 500 S.E.2d at 355) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
61. Johnson v. Green Growth 1, LLC, 305 Ga. App. 134, 138, 699 S.E.2d 109, 112
(2010).
62. Id. at 134, 699 S.E.2d at 109-10.
63. Id. at 141, 699 S.E.2d at 113 (quoting Commerce Props. v. Linthicom, 209 Ga. App.
853, 854, 434 S.E.2d 769, 771 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lariscy
v. Eschette, 306 Ga. App. 205, 206-07, 702 S.E.2d 49, 51 (2010) (holding that guest of
tenants failed to show superior knowledge by owner when "she had traversed the back
stairs many times before her fall, and . . . was well aware of the two defective conditions
of which she complained"); Barnes v. Morganton Baptist Ass'n, Inc., 306 Ga. App. 755, 755,
703 S.E.2d 359, 360 (2010) (holding that defendants in wrongful death action "did not have
superior knowledge of the danger posed by [a] retaining wall and [al drop-off therefrom").
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.6 Thus, when
for damages arising from the tenant's negligence ....
patron
in
the parking lot
restaurant
an unknown assailant shot a Macon
judgment for
summary
fight,
up
a
while the latter was trying to break
restaurant
the
because
affirmed
was
the out-of-possession landlord
lot."
the
parking
owner had exclusive control of
In Ramcke v. Georgia Power Co.," the representative of a decedent
struck by machinery while working as an invitee of a Georgia Power
Company contractor reached a jury trial," but the court of appeals
The
affirmed the grant of a directed verdict to all three defendants.
court was particularly persuaded by the contract between the parties."
Finally, plaintiffs' counsel should remember in premises liability cases
that "evidence of noncompliance with OSHA regulations is admissible as
evidence of an employer's negligence."" Thus, a jury verdict for CSX
Transportation was reversed when the trial court denied a jury charge
requested by plaintiff's counsel regarding an Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) regulation."

64. Lake v. APH Enters., LLC, 306 Ga. App. 317, 319, 702 S.E.2d 654, 656 (2010).
65. Id. at 317-18, 320, 702 S.E.2d at 655, 656; see also Ramcke v. Ga. Power Co., 306
Ga. App. 736, 739, 703 S.E.2d 13, 16 (2010) (holding that when a "property owner or
occupier surrenders temporary possession and control. . . to an independent contractor to
perform work on the property, the owner/occupier is generally not liable ... for injuries
sustained . . . by the contractor's invitees due to unsafe working conditions . . . which the

owner/occupier had no right to control"-rather, "the independent contractor has the duty
to keep the work premises safe . . .").
66. 306 Ga. App. 736, 703 S.E.2d 13 (2010).
67. The case is unclear as to whether the defendants moved for summary judgment
prior to trial.
68. Ramcke, 306 Ga. App. at 736, 703 S.E.2d at 14-15.
69. Id. at 739-40, 703 S.E.2d at 17. Under the contract, the construction company hired
to perform grading and site preparation was to "furnish all labor, materials, and
supervision on the project in accordance with the project specifications" and, even though
Georgia Power could inspect or stop the work to ensure compliance, the court found that
fact alone did "not amount to a right to control the time or manner of the work." Id.
70. Smith v. CSX Transp., Inc., 306 Ga. App. 897, 901, 703 S.E.2d 671, 675 (2010),
affd, CSX Transp., Inc. v. Smith, No. S11G0556, 2011 WL 490574 (Ga. Oct. 17, 2011); see
also Womack v. Oasis Goodtime Emporium I, Inc., 307 Ga. App. 323, 328, 705 S.E.2d 199,
203 (2010) (holding that violation of statute or regulation may provide grounds for a
negligence per se claim).
71. CSX Transp., Inc., 306 Ga. App. at 903, 703 S.E.2d at 676-77. Of particular
interest, Presiding Judge Andrews, joined by Judges Johnson and Doyle, filed a dissent in
this whole court opinion. Id. at 904, 909, 703 S.E.2d at 677, 680 (Andrews, J., dissenting);
see also supra note 54 and infra notes 82 and 128 for other recent dissents by Judge
Andrews.
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DERIVATIVE LIABILITY

"Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a master is liable for the
tort of its servant only to the extent that the servant committed the tort
in connection with his employment by the master, within the scope of his
employment, and in furtherance of his master's business."72 In BT
Two, Inc. v. Bennett," the court of appeals reversed the denial of
summary judgment to the defendant BT Two, Inc. (Buffalo's) on the
plaintiff's claims for injuries sustained in an attack by an employee,
King, and another unidentified person without provocation at a party
allegedly sponsored by Buffalo's.74 The party was hosted at a private
residence to raise money for a Buffalo's manager moving away." The
event was advertised on flyers at the restaurant stating, "PARTY!!!!
HELP BUFFALO'S SAY FAREWELL TO THE BEST DAMN MANAGER
EVER, ASK ANYONE FOR DIRECTIONS. $5.00 COVER ONLY ALL
NIGHT!!!!"" Several Buffalo's employees attended the party, some
wearing Buffalo's uniforms, and a woman wearing a Buffalo's shirt sold
wristbands that entitled the purchaser to unlimited beer."
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the party was sponsored by
Buffalo's and that King attended the party in connection with his
employment, the court of appeals concluded that Buffalo's was not
vicariously liable for King's attack because there was no evidence that
the attack was among his job responsibilities or had furthered any
business purpose." The court also addressed the plaintiff's negligent
sponsorship and inadequate security claims by dismissing the first as
barred by the Georgia Dram Shop Act (GDSA)" and the second because
there was no evidence that Buffalo's had superior knowledge of the
danger that the plaintiff might be assaulted at the party, despite the
service of unlimited alcohol, because this knowledge was imputed to the
plaintiff.so

72. BT Two, Inc. v. Bennett, 307 Ga. App. 649, 652, 706 S.E.2d 87, 90 (2011); see also
O.C.G.A. § 51-2-2 (2000).
73. 307 Ga. App. 649, 706 S.E.2d 87 (2011).
74. Id. at 649-50, 706 S.E.2d at 88-89.
75. Id. at 650, 706 S.E.2d at 89.
76. Id.
77. Id.

78. Id. at 652-53, 706 S.E.2d at 90-91.
79. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40 (2000).
80. BT Two, 307 Ga. App. at 654-56, 706 S.E.2d at 91-93. Interestingly, this opinion
is only physical precedent due to Judge Barnes filing a special concurrence finding only
"circumstantial evidence that Buffalo's sponsored or participated in giving the party." Id.
at 657, 706 S.E.2d at 93 (Barnes, J., concurring specially).
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In a consolidated appeal in Coe v. Carroll& Carroll, Inc.,s a driver's
widow filed suit against a tractor-trailer driver, Williams, his employer,
Griffin; and the contractor, Carroll, who hired Williams and the truck
from Griffin. The plaintiff filed suit after her husband, Coe, suffered
serious injury when his automobile struck a tractor-trailer allegedly
negligently parked on the side of the road by Williams. 82 The court
provided a clear recitation of derivative liability for employers and
contractors under the law of bailments, borrowed servants, and
respondeat superior in the trucking context.83
The trial court granted summary judgment to both Carroll and Griffin
on the grounds that Williams was not Carroll's borrowed servant, and
when the wreck occurred, he had detoured 2.5 miles to pick up lunch on
a purely personal mission not within the scope of his employment or to
further Griffin's business. Carroll hired Griffin, without a written
contract, to supply a tractor, trash trailer, and a driver, at an hourly
rate, to haul trash away from Carroll's construction site. Griffin
assigned Williams to the job site. Carroll had no authority to terminate
Williams, but could tell Griffin to send a new driver in his place. On site,
Carroll's foreman directed Williams's hauls including arrival time, when
and where to take a load, and when the work day was done. Importantly, Griffin's drivers, including Williams, were not afforded a lunch break
but ate on the road or at the job site while on the clock."
Reversing the trial court, the court of appeals determined that
Carroll's liability for Williams's negligence was governed by the laws of
bailments and whether Williams was a borrowed servant." Generally,
the hirer (Carroll) would not be liable to third parties or the bailor
(Griffin) for the acts of the bailor's employee (Williams) during his hire,
except for the consequences of the hirer's own direction or gross
neglect." However, when the hirer "'had complete control and direction of the [bailor's employee] for the occasion,' whereas the bailor had
no such control, and (2) if the hirer 'had the exclusive right to discharge
the [bailor's employee] [1'" the bailor's employee is a borrowed servant,

81. 308 Ga. App. 777, 709 S.E.2d 324 (2011).
82. Id. at 777, 709 S.E.2d at 327. Judge Andrews dissented, with Judge Doyle, and
would have affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Griffin and Carroll. Id. at 788, 709
S.E.2d at 335 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 779-80, 782, 709 S.E.2d at 328-29, 331 (majority opinion).
84. Id. at 777-79, 709 S.E.2d at 327-28.
85. Id. at 781-82, 709 S.E.2d at 330.
86. O.C.G.A. § 44-12-62 (b) (2000).
87. Coe, 308 Ga. App. at 780, 709 S.E.2d at 329 (alteration in original) (quoting Tim's
Crane & Rigging, Inc. v. Gibson, 278 Ga. 796, 797, 604 S.E.2d 763, 765 (2004)).
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and the hirer is responsible for his negligence.' While this determination can be made as a matter of law when the borrowed servant doctrine
is explicitly determined by a contract between the bailor and hirer, when
there is none, the relationship is generally a jury question."9
The court of appeals also reversed summary judgment for Griffin on
plaintiff's claims under the respondeat superior doctrine.9 0 After
reviewing the presumption that an employee is acting in the scope of his
employment while driving his employer's vehicle," and the burden
shifting back to a plaintiff upon rebuttal, the court stated the rule
that
[ilf a servant steps aside from his master's business to do an act
entirely disconnected from it or commits a tortious act for purely
personal reasons disconnected from the authorized business of the
master, the servant is not acting in the scope of his or her employment
and in the furtherance of the master's business.93
One such deviation is taking a lunch break;94 however, a jury question
lies
if an employee, who is driving to or from a destination while acting
within the scope of his employment and in furtherance of the employer's business, detours slightly from the direct or customary route to
that destination to get a meal, and if there is evidence that it serves

88. Id. (quoting Montgomery Trucking Co. v. Black, 231 Ga. 211, 213, 200 S.E.2d 882,
884 (1973)).
89. Id. at 780-81, 709 S.E.2d at 329-30.
90. Id. at 786-87, 709 S.E.2d at 334.
91.
Where a vehicle is involved in a collision, and it is shown that the [vehicle] is
owned by a person, and that the operator of the vehicle is in the employment of
that person, a presumption arises that the employee was in the scope of his
employment at the time of the collision, and the burden is then on the defendant
employer to show otherwise. This must be done by clear, positive and uncontradicted evidence.
Allen Kane's Major Dodge v. Barnes, 243 Ga. 776, 777, 257 S.E.2d 186, 188 (1979)
(citations omitted) (quoting West Point Pepperell, Inc. v. Knowles, 132 Ga. App. 253, 255,
208 S.E.2d 17, 19 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Farzaneh v. Merit
Constr. Co., 309 Ga. App. 637, 640, 710 S.E.2d 839, 843 (2011).
92. Hicks v. Heard, 297 Ga. App. 689, 690-91, 678 S.E.2d 145, 147-48 (2009), affd,
Hicks v. Heard, 286 Ga. 864, 692 S.E.2d 360 (2010).
93. Coe, 308 Ga. App. at 783, 709 S.E.2d at 331 (quoting Piedmont Hosp. v. Palladino,
276 Ga. 612, 613-14, 580 S.E.2d 215, 217 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. Id. (quoting Gassaway v. Precon Corp., 280 Ga. App. 351, 353, 634 S.E.2d 153, 165
(2006)).
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the employer's interests for the employee to make the slight detour for
that purpose[,]
such as Williams's speedy return to the job site.96
Generally, an employer is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor;97 however, an employer may become liable depending
on the nature and result of work performed, the relationship between
the employer and the contractor, if the act violates an express contract
In
or statute, or if the employer ratifies the contractor's wrong."
Yancey v. Watkins," the court of appeals held that the aerial application of chemicals was an inherently dangerous activity, bringing it
within the scope of O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5,'0o for which an employer can be
held liable for the negligence of an independent contractor hired to
perform such work. 10

IV.

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

The Georgia Supreme Court considered, in a 4-3 opinion, the following
questions in Cowart v. Widener, 0 2 a case alleging negligent or intentional deprivation of necessary medical attention: "(1) whether expert
evidence is required to establish causation in a simple negligence case
where a medical question is involved; and (2) if so, what constitutes a
'medical question' so as to require such expert testimony."l03 The court
essentially answered yes to the first question, noting that "plaintiffs
must come forward with expert evidence to survive a defense motion for
summary judgment, where 'medical questions' relating to causation are
involved."lO4 The court then explained that, when a jury has to know
the answers to one or more "medical questions" that "can be answered
accurately only by witnesses with specialized expert knowledge," newly
termed "specialized medical questions," an expert is required.'" In

95.

Id. at 784-85, 709 S.E.2d at 332.

96. Id.
97. O.C.G.A. § 51-2-4 (2000).
98. Id.; see also Peachtree-Cain Co. v. McBee, 170 Ga. App. 38, 39, 316 S.E.2d 9, 11
(1984) (holding that O.C.G.A. § 51-2-4 is inapplicable to intentional torts of independent
contractors), affd, 254 Ga. 91, 327 S.E.2d 188 (1985).
99. 308 Ga. App. 695, 708 S.E.2d 539 (2011).
100. O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5(2) (2000).
101. Yancey, 308 Ga. App. at 699-700, 708 S.E.2d at 544; see also Cmty. Gas Co. v.
Williams, 87 Ga. App. 68, 80, 73 S.E.2d 119, 128-29 (1952) (listing inherently dangerous
activities subjecting employer to independent contractor's negligence liability).
102. 287 Ga. 622, 697 S.E.2d 779 (2010).
103. Id. at 622, 697 S.E.2d at 781.
104. Id. at 627, 697 S.E.2d at 784.
105. Id. at 629, 697 S.E.2d at 786 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Cowart, because the evidence in the record was insufficient, summary
judgment was properly granted by the trial court and properly affirmed
by the court of appeals.'o
Revisiting ex parte interviews of treating physicians by defense
counsel and its decision in Moreland v. Austin,"o' in Baker v. Wellstar
Health System, Inc.,'o the Georgia Supreme Court determined that the
qualified protective order' 09 obtained by the defendant in a medical
malpractice action complied with the procedural requirements of the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA)"o but
violated the plaintiff's substantive constitutional right to medical
privacy.. because of the breadth of medical information disclosure it
allowed." 2
Looking to limit the defendant's inquiry to "matters
relevant to the medical condition [plaintiffl ha[d] placed at issue,""'
the court enumerated the dangers of broad protective orders and
circumscribed the waiver of the medical privacy right by providing the
following list of elements a trial court should state in their qualified
protective order with particularity:
(1) the name(s) of the health care provider(s) who may be interviewed;
(2) the medical condition(s) at issue in the litigation regarding which
the health care provider(s) may be interviewed; (3) the fact that the
interview is at the request of the defendant, not the patient-plaintiff,
and is for the purpose of assisting defense counsel in the litigation; and

106. Id. at 637, 697 S.E.2d at 790-91. Justice Nahmias authored the opinion. Id. at
621,697 S.E.2d at 781. All the justices concurred, except Justice Thompson, who concurred
only in Divisions 1 and 2 and in the judgment, and Chief Justice Hunstein, Presiding
Justice Carley, and Justice Benham, who concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing
that the majority failed to apply the proper standard of review and improperly construed
the evidence, since "genuine issues of material fact remain for a jury to decide." Id. at 638,
697 S.E.2d at 791 (Hunstein, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
107. 284 Ga. 730, 733, 670 S.E.2d 68, 71 (2008) (holding that, despite a plaintiffs
statutory waiver of constitutional right to privacy regarding medical records that are
relevant to a medical condition the plaintiff placed in issue, HIPPA preempted Georgia law
and precluded ex parte communications between defense counsel and a plaintiffs prior
treating physicians absent plaintiffs consent, court order, or compliance with the
procedural provisions of 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (2010)).
108. 288 Ga. 336, 703 S.E.2d 601 (2010).
109. The court order stated that "lp)laintiffs treating physicians and other healthcare
providers may discuss [p]laintiff s medical conditions and any past, present, or future care
and treatment with [dlefendant's counsel." Id. at 338, 703 S.E.2d at 604.
110. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (2010).
111. King v. State, 272 Ga. 788, 790, 535 S.E.2d 492, 495 (2000).
112. Baker, 288 Ga. at 338, 703 S.E.2d at 604.
113.
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(4) the fact that the health care provider's participation in the
interview is voluntary." 4
The court also advised that in issuing or modifying their order,
depending on the facts and evidence, trial courts should consider
whether to require defense counsel "to provide the patient-plaintiff with
prior notice of, and the opportunity to appear at, scheduled interviews
or, alternatively, requiring the transcription of the interview by a court
reporter at the patient-plaintiff's request." 15
In Wilson v. Obstetrics & Gynecology of Atlanta, PC.,"' reversing
the trial court, the court of appeals found evidence sufficient to create a
jury question that the defendants deliberately engaged in fraudulent
misrepresentation of blood gas test results at the birth of the plaintiffs
child."' The court also determined that defendants withheld from or
failed to disclose information" to the parents preventing them from
realizing that their daughter's oxygen deprivation and resulting brain
This
damage at birth were possibly the result of medical error."
created jury questions as to whether the statute of limitations should be
tolled" 0 and the defendants estopped from asserting the statute of
reposel 2 ' by defendants' alleged fraud.122
In Brustcato v. O'Brien,12 a severely mentally-ill man with a history
of violence sued his psychiatrist for negligent withdrawal and monitoring
of his medication when, a few months after discontinuing two medications, he killed his mother. 12 4 The court of appeals reversed the trial

114. Id. at 339, 703 S.E.2d at 604-05.
115. Id. at 340, 703 S.E.2d at 605.
116. 304 Ga. App. 300, 696 S.E.2d 339 (2010).
117. Id. at 300, 696 S.E.2d at 340-41; see also Dove v. Ty Cobb Healthcare Sys., 305 Ga.
App. 13, 699 S.E.2d 355 (2010); cf Estate of Shannon v. Ahmed, 304 Ga. App. 380, 696
S.E.2d 408 (2010).
118.
Defendants' failure to disclose: (i) the fact that no one determined the baby's
position before labor-inducing drugs were administered to the mother; (ii) the
recorded episodes of Karah's fetal heart rate deceleration in the presence of
Northside employees, without prompt action; and (iii) the fact that no fetal heart
rate was detected and/or recorded for the 33 minutes prior to Karah's birth.
Wilson, 304 Ga. App. at 306, 696 S.E.2d at 344.
119. Id. at 300-01, 696 S.E.2d at 340-41.
120. See O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96 (2007).
121. See O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71(b) (2007); see also Dove, 305 Ga. App. at 15, 699 S.E.2d at
357; Osburn v. Goldman, 269 Ga. App. 303, 303, 603 S.E.2d 695, 696-97 (2004).
122. Wilson, 304 Ga. App. at 300-01, 696 S.E.2d at 340-41.
123. 307 Ga. App. 452, 705 S.E.2d 275 (2010), affd, O'Brien v. Brustcato, 289 Ga. 739,
715 S.E.2d 120 (2011).
124. Id. at 452-54, 705 S.E.2d at 277-78.

358

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

court's grant of summary judgment to the psychiatrist, which barred the
patient's claims for "[miental distress and anguish" damages based on
the "impact rule" and on public policy grounds preventing a wrongdoer
from recovering from his own wrongful act.12
On the first issue, the court of appeals reversed the trial court,
concluding that "the medical malpractice statute, which provides that
'any injury' resulting from the breach of a physician's duty is a
compensable injury, is not limited by the application of the 'impact
rule [,]"' in statute or on public policy grounds, or inapplicable to actions
sounding in medical malpractice with emotional distress. 12 6
On a question that has widespread implication, the court found that
because he was presumed innocent1 27 and there had been no adjudication as to his sanity at the time of the homicide, his guilt, or his
responsibility for his mother's murder due to his incompetency to stand
trial, the patient was not barred by any policy preventing "a wrongdoer
who is barred from profiting from his crimel,]" and thus a jury issue
existed as to whether he had the "requisite mental capacity to commit

murder."128

V.

CONCLUSION

Although much of the case law is generated from the court of appeals,
particularly in slip and fall and auto accident cases, the Georgia
Supreme Court demonstrated this survey period that it is not hesitant
to weigh in when the opportune time arises on issues of major importance to both the trial and defense bar. While additional legislative
action in the name of "tort reform" appears to have stalled, at least
during this survey period, the close decisions in both whole court
opinions from the court of appeals and cases from the supreme court still
give those practitioners interested in this debate plenty to monitor,
analyze, and, perhaps, guess about regarding tort reform.

125. Id. at 455, 705 S.E.2d at 279 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
126. Id. at 456-58, 705 S.E.2d at 279-81.
127. See O.C.G.A. § 16-1-5 (2007).
128. Bruscato, 307 Ga. App. at 459-60, 705 S.E.2d at 282. Division 2 of Judge
Andrews's dissent, joined by Judges Doyle and Johnson, would affirm the trial court's
decision and adopt the public policy bar even if the plaintiff did not possess the requisite
mens rea to establish culpability for the illegal act. Id. at 462, 465, 705 S.E.2d at 284-86
(Andrews, J., dissenting).

